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Controlled Parameter Modulations in Secure Digital Signal Transmissions
P. Palaniyandi∗ and M. Lakshmanan†
Centre for Nonlinear Dynamics, School of Physics,
Bharathidasan University, Tiruchirapalli 620 024, India
We propose a simple method for secure digital signal transmission by making some modifications
in the single-step parameter modulation technique proposed earlier into overcome certain inherent
deficiencies. In the modified method, the parameter modulation is effectively regulated or controlled
by the chaotic signal obtained from the transmitting chaotic system so that it has the maximum
security. Then, the same idea is also extended to the multistep parameter modulation technique.
It is found that both the methods are secure against ciphertext (return map) and plaintex attacks.
We have illustrated these methods by means of the Lorenz system.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Sometime ago, Pecora and Carroll have shown that
two identical chaotic systems (namely, drive and response
systems) can be synchronized by an appropriate cou-
pling between them [Pecora & Carroll, 1990; Pecora &
Carroll, 1991]. This idea immediately motivated several
researcher to use chaotic signal for secure communica-
tion purpose with the belief that it will be difficult for
an intruder to decipher the transmitted message without
the knowledge of the transmitting chaotic system, due to
its extremely high sensitiveness to the initial conditions
and parameter mismatches. As a result, a number of
methods have been proposed for secure communication
and cryptography [Hayes et al, 1993; Cuomo & Oppen-
heim, 1993; Murali & Lakshmanan, 1993a; Murali & Lak-
shmanan, 1993b; Kocarev & Parlitz,1995; Lakshmanan
& Murali, 1996; Zhang et al, 1998; Baptista, 1998; He
& Vaidya,1998; Wong et al, 2003; Kocarev et al, 2004;
Bowong, 2004; Hua et al, 2005; Chee & Xu 2006] using
chaotic signals. In particular, Cuomo and Oppenheim
[Cuomo & Oppenheim, 1993] have suggested a very sim-
ple method for secure digital signal transmission using
the property of the coupled chaotic systems that a small
difference between the corresponding parameters in the
drive and response systems will cause synchronization
frustration in their dynamical variables. Here, the driv-
ing signal which drives the response or receiver system
is used as a carrier signal in the digital signal transmis-
sion. During transmission, the digital message is imposed
on this carrier signal through parameter variations. So,
one may call the driving signal which implicitly bears
the digital message as modulated driving signal and the
process as parameter modulation. However, Pe´rez and
Cerdeira [Pe´rez & Cerdeira, 1995] have shown that it is
possible to reconstruct this masked message by an eaves-
dropper from a simple return map formed by the ex-
trema of the modulated driving signal, even without any
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knowledge about the chaotic systems (transmitter and
receiver). To overcome the return map attack, several
methods have been suggested by many authors [Murali
& Lakshmanan, 1998; Mensour & Longtin, 1998; Mi-
nai & Pandian, 1998; Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001]:
Private communication using compound chaotic signal
technique, using delay-differential equations technique,
communication through noise, multistep parameter mod-
ulation and so on. However, most of these methods are
found to be very difficult to implement, and some of them
have been shown to be not so secure as expected. For
example, we have proposed a method called multistep
parameter modulation to complicate the patterns in the
return map so that the reconstruction of the message by
an eavesdropper is almost impossible [Palaniyandi & Lak-
shmanan, 2001]. However, Li et al [Li et al, 2006] have
very recently pointed out that the multistep parameter
modulation suggested by us may not be so secure as was
expected for smaller modulation steps (n). These au-
thors have also pointed out that the multistep parameter
modulation technique is secure only if n > 50, instead
of n > 17 expected in our analysis. In order to remove
such difficulties, in this Letter, we introduce a new tech-
nique called controlled parameter modulation in which
the modulation is effectively directed or regulated by the
chaotic signal obtained from one of the dynamical quanti-
ties of the transmitter, instead of external predetermined
regulation where a particular value of modulation param-
eter is preassigned for transmitting ‘0’ or ‘1’ bit in the
digital message.
The Letter is organized as follows. In Secs. II&III,
we briefly outline the single-step and multistep parame-
ter modulation techniques and the possible cryptographic
attacks on these methods. To overcome the drawbacks
of these techniques, a controlled parameter modulation
technique is introduced in Sec. IV. The controlled single-
step parameter modulation technique is illustrated and
its security against various cryptographic attacks is given
Sec. V. The same analysis is done for the controlled mul-
tistep parameter modulation technique in Sec. VI. Fi-
nally, in Sec. VII, we summarize the results of our anal-
ysis.
2II. SINGLE-STEP PARAMETER MODULATION
Let us now outline the method of digital signal trans-
mission by single-step parameter modulation proposed
by Cuomo and Oppenheim, illustrated by means of the
Lorenz system [Cuomo & Oppenheim, 1993]. In this case,
the chaotic signal is produced at the transmitting end by
x˙s = σ(ys − xs), (1a)
y˙s = rxs − ys − xszs, (1b)
z˙s = xsys − bzs, (1c)
where the parameters σ and r take the values 16.0 and
45.6, respectively. The remaining parameter b is chosen
for the purpose of modulation, which is assigned (for il-
lustration) either the value 4.0 or 4.4 depending upon the
nature of the digital information to be transmitted. At
the receiving end, the chaotic signals are generated from
the system
x˙r = σ(yr − xr), (2a)
y˙r = rxs − yr − xszr, (2b)
z˙r = xsyr − bzr, (2c)
where σ = 16.0, r = 45.6 and b = 4.0. Note that the
receiver is driven by xs and the value of modulation pa-
rameter (b) has been now fixed in the receiver. The cou-
pling of this type was introduced by Pecora and Carroll
[Pecora & Carroll, 1990] for achieving synchronization
between two identical chaotic systems.
The transmission of digital information is done as fol-
lows. The value of modulation parameter (b) is switched
between 4.0 and 4.4 in the transmitter according to the
nature of the digital message. Due to this switching in the
values of modulation parameter b, the receiver is driven
either by xs corresponding to the set of values of the pa-
rameters 16.0, 45.6 and 4.0, for σ, r and b, respectively, if
the transmitted message bit is ‘0’, or by xs corresponding
to another set of parameter values 16.0, 45.6 and 4.4, for
σ, r and b, respectively, if the transmitted message bit is
‘1’. Note that the transmitting and receiving chaotic sys-
tems have identical sets of values of the parameters while
a binary state ‘0’ is transmitted, and there is a variation
in the corresponding values of b in these systems while
the other binary state ‘1’ is transmitted. As a result,
the receiver will synchronize with the transmitter when
the message bit transmitted is ‘0’ and asynchronization
takes place if the transmitted message bit is ‘1’. Then the
transmitted digital bit is reconstructed at the receiver us-
ing the synchronization error power (xr−xs)
2, since it is
negligible when the transmitter and receiver systems are
synchronized, and it has some finite value when they are
not synchronized. We can call the above procedure as a
single-step parameter modulation, since the modulation
parameter b can have only one value for each state of the
binary message (that is, in this method of transmission,
b can take only a single value, 4.4 for any high state (‘1’)
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FIG. 1: Return map between Am and Bm obtained from the
modulated driving signal xs of the Lorenz system in single-
step parameter modulation.
in the digital message and 4.0 for the low state (‘0’) of
digital message at the transmitter).
A. Return Map Attack
Eventhough the single-step parameter modulation
technique is very simple and found to be secure enough
against many possible security attacks proposed by Short
[Short, 1994; Short, 1996; Short, 1997; Short, 1998],
Pe´rez and Cerdeira have shown that the message can
be extracted or unmasked from the return map con-
structed from the modulated drive signal, without any
receiver circuit [Pe´rez & Cerdeira, 1995]. In their work,
the maxima Xm and minima Ym are collected from the
modulated driving signal (xs) and two new variables
Am = (Xm + Ym)/2 and Bm = Xm − Ym are defined.
Then a return map is plotted between Am and Bm as
shown in Fig. 1. Note that there are 3 segments in the
attractor of the return map, each one further splits into
two strips. It is then obvious to assume that the split
in the return map attractor is due to the change in the
values of the parameter b at the transmitter between 4.0
and 4.4 (hence it may be assumed that one strip in each
segment corresponds to the high state and the other cor-
responds to the low state of the digital message). From
this return map one can easily unmask the message by
noting which points (Am, Bm), fall on which strips in
each segment at various instants of time. If we assume
that 6 strips are independent of each other, then the at-
tack complexity is 8 [Pe´rez & Cerdeira, 1995; Palaniyandi
& Lakshmanan, 2001].
III. MULTISTEP PARAMETER MODULATION
In order to complicate the patterns in the return map,
we have proposed a multistep parameter modulation
where ‘1’ bit is transmitted using a set of n predeter-
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FIG. 2: Return map between Am and Bm calculated from the
modulated driving signal xs of the Lorenz system in multistep
parameter modulation (n = 5).
mined values of the parameter b and ‘0’ bit is transmitted
by making use of another set of n predetermined values
of b (n > 1 and sufficiently large) [Palaniyandi & Lak-
shmanan, 2001]. At the receiver end, we use n receiver
subsystems, each one with a different value of b. The set
of values of b assigned at the receiver is nothing but the
set of n values of b which are used in the transmitter for
modulating a high state of the digital message. We call
this number n as the step of the modulation.
Let us now describe this method for a modulation step
5. It can be easily verified that the Lorenz system (1)
exhibits chaotic behavior when the parameter b takes any
value between 1.5 and 6.8 while the other parameters are
fixed at σ = 16.0 and r = 45.6. As an illustration, the
parameter b in the transmitting chaotic system is allowed
to take any one of the five values 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, and 3.9,
for transmitting a high state (‘1’), while it can have any
one of the other five values 3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8, and 4.0, for
transmitting a low state (‘0’). In the receiver part, we
use 5 subsystems with the modulation parameter b fixed
at 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, and 3.9.
The method works as follows. Suppose we have a high
state in the digital message, to start with. Then, the
receiver is driven by the modulated driving signal ob-
tained for the modulation parameter b = 3.1. For the
next high state in the message, the modulation is done
with b = 3.3 and this process continues upto the value
3.9. Then the value of b is reset to 3.1. The same pro-
cedure is followed for transmitting the low state of the
message but with the modulation parameter (b) taking
the values 3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8, and 4.0 in that order. In the
receiver end, all the subsystems are driven by the modu-
lated driving signal. If the transmitted message is in the
high state, then one of the subsystems in the receiver will
be synchronized with the transmitter. If none of the sub-
systems is synchronized, then it is taken that the message
transmitted is in the low state.
A. Return Map/Ciphertext Attack
The return map constructed from the modulated driv-
ing signals used in multistep parameter modulation tech-
nique is shown in Fig. 2. Now, we have 10 strips in each
segment. This corresponds to 2×n strips, where n is the
step of the parameter modulation. Because of this in-
crease in number of strips in each segment, it was claimed
in our earlier paper [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001]
that it would be difficult to unmask the message from the
return map. However, Li et al [Li et al, 2006] have very
recently pointed out that the multistep parameter mod-
ulation suggested by us may not be so secure as was ex-
pected for smaller modulation steps. These authors have
also noted that there exists a deterministic relationship
between the positions of the 2n strips of a segment and
the 2n different values of the modulation parameter ‘b’,
and this relationship will reduce the attack complexity of
the return map. This can be easily viewed in the single-
step parameter modulation (from Fig. 1) that the strips
corresponding to b = 4.0 are closer to the origin in all the
three segments and the strips corresponding to b = 4.4
are away from the origin. This means that there exists
only two different possibilities of assigning 0/1 bit to the
strips in all the segments instead of eight: Assign 0-bit
(1-bit) to the strips closer to the origin and 1-bit (0-bit)
to the strips away from the origin. The above analysis
can be possibly generalized to the multistep parameter
modulation and hence the task of assigning 0/1 bit to 6n
strips (2n strips for each segment) in the return map is re-
duced to an another task of assigning 0/1 bit to 2n strips
or 2n different vales of b. Thus, the attack complexity
of the return map obtained in the case of multistep pa-
rameter modulation becomes 22n − 2, or approximately,
22n instead of 26n. Due to today’s advancement in the
computer technology, a practically secure cryptosystem
is acceptable only if it has an attack complexity greater
than 2100. As a result, the multistep parameter modu-
lation technique is secure only if n > 50, instead of our
earlier envisaged modulation step n ≈ 17. Eventhough it
is practically possible to implement the multistep param-
eter modulation with modulation step greater than 50, it
will become more expensive. For this reason, we look for
an appropriate improvement in the parameter modula-
tion technique and is given in the following section.
B. Plaintext Attack
Now let us consider the security of the multistep pa-
rameter modulation against known-plaintext or chosen-
plaintext attacks. In known/chosen-plaintext attacks,
it is obvious that the knowledge about some plaintexts
means the knowledge about some bit assignment of the
6n strips in the return map: When the message trans-
mitted is known to be 0-bit (1-bit), one immediately con-
cludes that the strip on which the point (Am, Bm) lies
corresponds to the 0-bit (1-bit). Once n 0-bits (1-bits)
4have been assigned to n different strips, that is, to n dif-
ferent values of b, the attacker can directly assign 1-bits
(0-bits) to all the remaining strips, that is, to the unde-
termined values of b, so as to complete the attack.
IV. CONTROLLED PARAMETER
MODULATION
In order to overcome various possible cryptographic
attacks [Short, 1994; Short, 1996; Short, 1997; Short,
1998; Pe´rez & Cerdeira, 1995; Li et al, 2006], we have
made a slight but effective modification in the parameter
modulation technique as explained below. We wish to
note that the chaotic drive system possesses not only the
chaotic signal xs, but also the other two chaotic signals
ys and zs. In general, there exists no simple relation be-
tween these signals. So, one can make effective use of the
remaining signals (other than that of xs) in the process of
switching of the modulation parameter so that any par-
ticular strip in the return map will represent both the ‘0’
and ‘1’ states. That is, the switching is carried out as a
function of the instantaneous values of ys and zs at some
time. If we incorporate these changes, then the switching
in the values of modulation parameter will depend on the
dynamics of the transmitting chaotic system, in addition
to the nature of the digital message to be transmitted.
That is, the modulation is now controlled or influenced by
the state values of the variables ys and zs of the transmit-
ting chaotic system. We may call this modified method
as the signal controlled parameter modulation, or simply,
controlled parameter modulation. This idea can be im-
plemented both in the single-step parameter modulation
and in the multistep parameter modulation techniques as
illustrated below.
V. CONTROLLED SINGLE-STEP PARAMETER
MODULATION
In the single-step parameter modulation described in
Sec. II, the value of b is switched between 4.0 and 4.4 in
the transmitter for imposing the digital information ‘0’
and ‘1’ bits, respectively, on the xs signal. Hence the as-
signment of the values to the parameter b depends only
on the nature of the digital message. But in the con-
trolled single-step parameter modulation, we introduce
an additional condition (any one of the conditions listed
below) while assigning the above values to the parameter
‘b’ during the transmission process. As a simple example,
we note the value of the chaotic signal corresponding to
the y variable of the transmitting chaotic system at the
time of switching of binary states (that is, from ‘0’ to
‘1’ or vice versa) if adjacent bits are different, or at the
time of transmitting the edge of the width of the first
bit if adjacent bits are identical. The value of y at this
instant is represented by yswt and it is used as the addi-
tional condition/parameter for determining the values of
the parameter b. That is, yswt is now used to control the
single-step parameter modulation. A simple way of using
yswt to control the single-step parameter modulation is
the following: If yswt > 0, the modulation parameter b
takes the value 4.4 while transmitting ‘1’ bits, and 4.0
for transmitting ‘0’ bits. On the other hand, if yswt < 0,
the modulation parameter b is assigned to have the val-
ues in the opposite manner, that is, b = 4.0 for sending
‘1’ bits, and b = 4.4 for sending ‘0’ bits. Note that the
binary bit 0/1 is now modulated using both the values
of the modulation parameter b, namely, 4.0 and 4.4. At
the receiver end, we incorporate two subsystems driven
by the modulated driving signal xs, one with the param-
eters σ = 16.0, r = 45.6 and b = 4.0, and the other with
σ = 16.0, r = 45.6 and b = 4.4. Since only these two
sets of values of the parameters are used in the transmit-
ter for modulation purpose, at the time of switching of
binary states, one of the subsystems is certainly synchro-
nized with the transmitting chaotic system whatever be
the message transmitted. Simultaneously, it is possible
to obtain yswt from the synchronized receiver subsystem
since yr = ys after transient time. Since the receiver
knows the rule of control on the parameter modulation
before hand, the message can be constructed from the
modulated driving signal xs by finding which of the sub-
systems in the receiver is synchronized with the trans-
mitting chaotic system once yswt is obtained. Note that
the signal ys is not transmitted to the receiver and so
it is not possible to obtain yswt by the intruder to deci-
pher xs directly. It is important to note that the above is
only an illustrative case and one can consider even more
complicated ways to control the parameter modulation
through various means:
1. By incorporating conditions on a complicated func-
tion of ys rather than on ys itself.
2. by introducing conditions on ys and zs considered
together (as yswt & zswt).
3. by introducing conditions on a complicated func-
tions of ys and zs.
and so on.
A. Return Map/Ciphertext Attack
In this method, the return map constructed from the
modulated driving signal is identical with the return map
in Fig. 1, since we have again used (as in the case of
single-step parameter modulation) the values 4.0 and 4.4
for b while modulating the digital message in the trans-
mitter. Eventhough one can assume different strips cor-
respond to the different values of b, it is now uncertain
to assign a binary bit 0/1 to a particular strip in the re-
turn map. This uncertainty is due to the fact that both
the values of b, namely, 4.0 and 4.4 have been used in
transmitting each state of the binary bits, either ‘0’ or
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FIG. 3: Messages extracted from the return map in con-
trolled single-step parameter modulation: (a) Original mes-
sage transmitted, (b) message obtained by assigning strips
closer to the origin correspond to the bit ‘0’ and the remain-
ing strips correspond to ‘1’ bit, and (c) message obtained by
assigning strips closer to the origin correspond to the bit ‘1’
and the remaining strips correspond to ‘0’ bit.
‘1’ at various intervals of time. As a result, the points
(Am, Bm) calculated from the modulated driving signal
fall on both the strips in all the segments of the return
map while transmitting either the binary state ‘0’ or the
binary state ‘1’. Thus, it is not possible to extract the
original message from the return map unless one knows
the rules by which the values of b are switched for trans-
mitting the digital information. As in the case of single-
step parameter modulation, if one assumes that the strips
closer to the origin corresponds to ‘0’ bit and the strips
away from the origin corresponds to ‘1’ bit or vice versa
[Li et al, 2006], then it is possible to obtain two differ-
ent messages as shown in Fig. 3. From this figure, it is
observed that the probability of extracting the original
message from the return map is practically negligible.
Hence, the controlled single-step parameter modulation
is secure against the return map attack.
B. Plaintext Attack
If there is a chance of finding the values of b which have
been used in the transmitting chaotic system from the re-
turn map, an intruder can construct the subsystems iden-
tical to the receiver subsystems and they can be driven
by the modulated driving signal xs. Eventhough it is al-
most impossible, still there is a chance to find the rules
by which the parameter modulation is controlled with
the help of known plaintexts and the synchronization of
intruder’s subsystems with transmitting chaotic system.
However, even this possibility can be eliminated if we use
complicated functions or time-varying functions of ys and
zs (collected at various instants of time) for controlling
the parameter modulation. So, the controlled single-step
parameter modulation appears to be reasonably secure
even against the plaintext attack.
VI. CONTROLLED MULTISTEP PARAMETER
MODULATION
To illustrate the controlled multistep parameter mod-
ulation, we again consider the Lorenz system with a set
of values of parameters used in Sec. III and a modula-
tion step of n = 5. Unlike the case of standard mul-
tistep parameter modulation, now the digital message
‘1’ is transmitted with one of the values of the modu-
lation parameter b in the set {3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, 3.9}, and
‘0’ is transmitted with one of the values of b from the
set {3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8, 4.0}, when yswt is positive. On
the other hand, if yswt is negative, the set of values
{3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8, 4.0} is used for the modulation while
sending ‘1’ bits in the digital message and the set of val-
ues {3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, 3.9} is used in the modulation for
sending ‘0’ bits in the message. It may be noted that all
the 10 values of b have been used for transmitting each
state, that is, either ‘1’ or ‘0’ of the digital message.
The transmission is done as follows. Suppose we have
the bit ‘1’ in the digital message to start with, then it is
transmitted by assigning 3.1 to the modulation param-
eter b. If the next bit is ‘1’, it is then modulated using
3.3 if yswt is greater than zero, or using 3.2 if yswt is less
than zero. On the other hand, if the second bit is ‘0’,
then the modulation is done using 3.2 if yswt is greater
than zero, or it is done using 3.3, if yswt is less than zero.
This process continues upto 3.9 and 4.0 in each set of
values of the modulation parameter b and then it is reset
to 3.1 and 3.2 in the respective sets. Thus, we have used
all the values (3.1, 3.2, . . . , 4.0) of b in transmitting each
state of the binary message.
In the receiver end, there are 10 subsys-
tems driven by the modulated driving signal xs,
each one with different values of b from the set
{3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 4.0}. Since one of
these values is used at the transmitter end while trans-
mitting the digital message, synchronization between
the transmitting chaotic system and one of the receiver
subsystems is always achieved. Hence, it is possible to
obtain yswt in the receiver end, from the synchronized
subsystem where yr = ys at any instant of time after
transient die down. As the nature of control on the
parameter modulation is known at the receiver end, the
message can be constructed from the modulated driving
signal xs by finding which of the subsystems in the
receiver is synchronized with the transmitting chaotic
system, once yswt is obtained.
6A. Return Map Attack
Now, the return map constructed from the modu-
lated driving signal is identical with the return map
in Fig. 2, since we have again used (as in the case
of multistep parameter modulation) the values from
the {3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 4.0} for b while
modulating the digital message in the transmitter. Even-
though one can assume different strips correspond to the
different values of b, it is not possible to assign a binary
bit 0/1 to a particular strip in the return map. Because,
now all the 10 values of b have been used in transmitting
each state of the binary bits, either ‘0’ or ‘1’ at various
interval of time. As a result, the points (Am, Bm) calcu-
lated from the modulated driving signal fall on all the 10
strips of a segment in the return map while transmitting
either the binary state ‘0’ or the binary state ‘1’. Thus,
it is not possible to extract the original message from
the return map unless one knows the means by which
the values of b are switched for transmitting the digital
information. Suppose the attacker randomly assume the
binary state 0/1 to each strip in the return map, then it
is possible to construct 22n−2 different messages, that is,
1022 different messages can be constructed for n = 5. In
general, none of the messages will resemble the original
message. Thus, there is practically negligible chance for
obtaining the exact message from the return map pro-
vided the message is long enough.
B. Plaintext Attack
As in the case of the controlled single-step parameter
modulation, controlled multistep parameter modulation
is secure against the plaintext attack if one uses the func-
tions or time-varying functions of ys and zs (collected at
various instants of time) for controlling the parameter
modulation.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a controlled parameter modulation
technique (applicable to both the single-step and mul-
tistep parameter modulations) wherein parameter mod-
ulation is controlled by a chaotic signal (other than the
driving signal) produced in the transmitter. These modi-
fied methods have been illustrated for the Lorenz system.
Also, it has been shown that the controlled single-step pa-
rameter modulation and controlled multistep parameter
modulation techniques are secure enough against both
the ciphertext and plaintext attacks.
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